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In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation:
Reopening the Door for Pharmaceutical
Competition
By Ahalya Sriskandarajah
One of the most controversial legal questions in the pharmaceutical industry today
concerns settlements of patent infringement suits between branded and generic drug
companies. These settlements, which are by-products of the Hatch-Waxman Act, involve
payments from the branded manufacturer to the generic drug company in exchange for
the generic company staying off the market for a period of time. For nearly a decade,
courts considering this issue applied a scope of the patent test to determine the validity of
these settlements. Over time, increasing deference was given to a presumption of patent
validity, and almost all challenged settlements were deemed valid. In June 2012, the
Third Circuit applied a quick look rule of reason test and found the settlement in question
invalid. The Third Circuit’s departure from the prevailing approach taken by its sister
circuits marked a shift towards stricter scrutiny and created a circuit split. After almost a
decade of effort by the Federal Trade Commission to get this issue before the Supreme
Court, certiorari was granted to a patent settlement case out of the Eleventh Circuit,
Actavis. It was the Third Circuit’s decision in favor of the FTC’s position that clinched
the effort this time. Following Actavis, reverse-payment settlements are not categorically
immune from the antitrust laws even when within the scope of the patent. Lower courts
must now weigh the settlement’s possible pro-competitive benefits against its potential
anticompetitive effects. As a result, the doors have been reopened for pharmaceutical
competition.
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¶2

¶3

One of the most controversial legal questions in the pharmaceutical industry today
concerns settlements of patent infringement suits between branded and generic drug
companies.1 These settlements, which are byproducts of the Hatch-Waxman Act, involve
payments from the branded manufacturer to the generic drug company in exchange for
the generic company staying off the market for a period of time.2 In effect, the Act creates
a financial incentive for branded manufacturers of drugs to settle their patent
infringement claims by paying generic manufacturers to refrain from selling their
product. These settlements are often called reverse-payment settlements because the
plaintiff in the patent infringement suit, the branded company, pays the defendant, the
generic company. They are also sometimes referred to as pay-for-delay settlements,
although this is an arguably loaded name.3
The D.C. Circuit and Sixth Circuit were the first to address reverse-payment
settlements, but the opinions were inconclusive.4 In Andrx Pharmaceuticals, the D.C.
Circuit dismissed the case on the pleadings.5 In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,
the Sixth Circuit’s precise holding is unclear because the agreement at issue involved
products not covered by the challenged patent.6
The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits decided this issue next and established
a judicial policy favoring reverse-payment settlements among federal courts of appeals.
These circuits made it clear in decisions issued between 2003 and 2008 that reversepayment settlements are not prohibited by the antitrust laws as long as the settlement falls
within the “scope of the patent.”7 They agreed that patents confer the right to exclude
1

See Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., IB10105, THE HATCH-WAXMAN
ACT: PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 4 (2004), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/IB10105.pdf.
2
See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their
Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 417 (1999).
3
Kurt R. Karst, Hot Ticket Item—Patent Settlement Agreement Challenges, FDA LAW BLOG (Aug. 29,
2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/08/hot-ticket-item-patent-settlementagreement-challenges-.html.
4
See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001); In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
5
J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements and the Supreme
Court, Remarks at CBI’s 2nd Annual Life Sciences Compliance, Legal, and Regulatory Congress 1, 2–3
(Sep. 21, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/120921cbipharmaspeech.pdf.
6
Id.
7
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003).
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others from “profiting from the patented invention” and stopping competitors from
marketing the products to which the patents apply is an exercise of that right. 8 Therefore,
reverse-payment settlements are not subject to antitrust scrutiny so long as the agreedupon delay in marketing the allegedly infringing generic does not extend beyond the
patent-protection period.9 The approach used by these Courts assumes the underlying
patent held by the branded company is “not only valid but infringed.”10 Applying the
scope of the patent test, numerous settlements of this type have been found valid under
antitrust laws in these circuits.11
The Third Circuit’s July 16, 2012 decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation is a
dramatic departure from the standard set by its sister circuits for resolving the validity of
reverse-payment agreements arising under the Hatch-Waxman Act.12 The Third Circuit,
in a unanimous panel decision, squarely rejected the scope of the patent test used by the
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits and instead adopted a quick look rule of reason
approach.13 The Third Circuit took issue with the scope of the patent test’s almost
irrefutable presumption of patent validity.14 As a move toward stricter scrutiny, the quick
look rule looks to the “economic realities of the reverse payment settlement.” 15 The rule
requires courts to:
treat any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees
to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable
restraint of trade, which could be rebutted by showing that the payment (1) was
for a purpose other than delayed entry [of generic competitors] or (2) offers some
pro-competitive benefit.16

¶5

This Note begins in Part I with an overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act, its impact
on the drug development process, and how the Act has spawned reverse-payment
settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical companies. Part II recounts the
treatment of reverse-payment settlements in court and focuses on the decisions which
gave rise to the scope of the patent test. In particular, the section will examine the
evolution of the scope of the patent test and its increasing deference to the presumption of
patent validity over time. Part III discusses the Third Circuit’s holding in In re K-Dur
Antitrust Litigation and how it represents a major step away from deference and towards
stricter scrutiny. The benefits and drawbacks of the quick look rule of reason test will be
considered in light of the scope of the patent test. This section will discuss how the quick
look test better serves the underpinnings of the Hatch-Waxman Act and patent law.
8

See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333.
Jeffrey May, Third Circuit Rejects Scope-of-Patent Test in Antitrust Challenge to K-Dur Patent
Settlement, WOLTERS KLUWER LAW & BUS. (July 16, 2012), http://antitrustconnect.com/2012/07/16/thirdcircuit-rejects-scope-of-patent-test-in-antitrust-challenge-to-k-dur-patent-settlement/.
10
Rosch, supra note 5, at 6.
11
See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012); Ark. Carpenters Health
& Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010).
12
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
13
Id.
14
Id. at 214–15.
15
Id. at 218.
16
Id.
9
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Finally, this Note concludes in Part V with a review of what has occurred since In re KDur. This section looks at the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Actavis,17 another
reverse-payment settlement case, and argues that the Third Circuit’s decision paved the
way for the Supreme Court’s rejection of the scope of the patent test.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
¶6

¶7

The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 is the federal
law that established the modern system of generic drugs.18 The informal name of the Act,
Hatch-Waxman, comes from the Act’s two major sponsors, Representative Harry
Waxman of California and Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah.19 The Act was legislatively
negotiated to strike a balance between two potentially competing policy interests:
“(1) inducing pioneering research and development of new drugs, and (2) enabling
competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of those drugs to market.”20
The Act has played a significant role in the U.S. healthcare system in many
respects, the most notable of which is the undeniable impact it has had on the emergence
of a robust generic drug industry.21 It has been successful in making low-cost generic
drugs rapidly available to consumers after patent expiration,22 and based on major strides
in pharmaceutical research and development, it evidently has not deterred innovation.
Despite the Act’s undeniable role in the emergence of the generic drug industry, many
also argue that certain provisions of the Act have been exploited to benefit generic or
branded pharmaceutical manufacturers and that this has occurred at the expense of both
innovation and the “timely introduction of lower cost drugs” to market.23 These critiques
arise from the ways in which drug companies, both generic and branded, behave as a
result of the Act and how courts treat this behavior.
A. Main Provisions of the Bill

¶8

Prior to the implementation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the pharmaceutical market
lacked generic competition, and no set process for FDA approval of generic drugs
existed. A company seeking approval of a generic version of an existing drug was
required to file a New Drug Application (NDA) and independently prove that the drug
was safe and effective, even if the pioneer drug had been on the market for years.24
Although there was an option to file a “paper NDA”—where published data
regarding the safety and efficacy of the drug could be used as proof—only fifteen generic
17

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
19
John M. Coster, The Waxman-Hatch Generic Drug Law 23 Years Later, U.S. PHARMACIST (June 19,
2007), http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/c/10305/?t=men%27s_health.
20
Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
21
See Coster, supra note 19.
22
SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 1.
23
Id.
24
See Laba Karki, Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The Hatch-Waxman Act,
Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent Enforcement, NEIFELD IP LAW P.C. 1, 7,
http://www.neifeld.com/pubs/reviewoffdalawrelatedtopharm.pdf.
18
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drugs used this method between 1962 and 1984.25 The necessary published data was not
readily available for most approved drugs, and it was still possible that the FDA would
require further proof, such as expensive clinical trials.26 Potential generics had little
incentive to enter the market with such an uncertain and expensive approval process. In
addition, would-be generic manufacturers were deterred by the looming risk of patent
infringement suits and the associated costs. Manufacturers of generic drugs do not stand
to profit as much as branded manufacturers and were therefore not willing to incur such
high market entry costs.
¶9
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act established a novel approval process for generic
drugs that streamlined the introduction of generics to market. A generic manufacturer
may now file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).27 The ANDA requires the
generic manufacturer to include limited tests that demonstrate the bioequivalence of a
proposed generic product to an FDA-approved branded product.28 And instead of
conducting independent safety and efficacy studies, the Act permits filing an ANDA that
relies on the safety and efficacy data acquired during a branded company’s clinical trials
conducted prior to the approval of the pioneering drug.29 Generics need not repeat these
studies. In addition to these changes, the Act prohibits the FDA from asking for any
additional proof regarding safety and efficacy.30 These provisions have been crucial in
facilitating the availability of generics on the market at the time of the pioneering drug’s
patent expiration.
¶10
The Act also confers periods of exclusivity to branded drugs in order to compensate
for the improvements made to the approval process of generics. Once a new molecular
entity or pioneer drug is approved by the FDA, a generic version of that drug cannot be
approved for a period of five years.31 Another exclusivity provision involves a period of
three years after the date of FDA approval of either a new use of a previously approved
molecular entity or a new dosage form using that entity that was based on clinical tests. 32
During these three years, the FDA is prohibited from approving an ANDA that relies
upon such trials.33
¶11
These exclusivity periods effectively grant a period of insulation from any possible
generic competition to the innovators of pioneer drugs. Exclusivity periods, which run
concurrently with any patent protection that may or may not expire during these periods,
are designed to “recognize the long, costly, and risky process involved in gaining FDA

25

See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999) (“After 1962, there was congressional
testimony that there were 150 drugs that were off-patent, but for which there were no generics because
generic companies simply would not spend the time and money doing the clinical trials to get to market,
and that there were only fifteen ‘paper NDAs,’ for post-1962 generics.”).
26
See Engelberg, supra note 2, at 397.
27
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006).
28
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
29
See id. § 355(j)(1)–(2); Karki, supra note 24, at 10.
30
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
31
Id. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii).
32
See id. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).
33
Id.

89

[2014

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

approval for an innovative
investment incentives.”34

product”

and

are

necessary

to

“maintain

B. Paragraph IV Certifications in Practice
¶12

When a generic manufacturer files an ANDA, it is also required to file a
certification that, “in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his knowledge,” the
proposed generic drug does not infringe any patent listed with the FDA as covering the
patented drug.35 A generic manufacturer can satisfy this requirement by certifying that
one of the following conditions is satisfied with respect to the branded drug: (I) no patent
for the drug was filed with the FDA, (II) the patent on the pioneering drug has expired,
(III) the ANDA drug will not be marketed until the patent on the existing pioneer drug
expires, or (IV) the patent covering the pioneer drug is invalid or would not be infringed
by the ANDA generic drug.36 The last of these is commonly known as a Paragraph IV
certification and is the provision that gives rise to Hatch-Waxman litigation between
generic and branded pharmaceutical companies and the resultant reversepayment settlements.
¶13
By statute, a Paragraph IV certification constitutes a technical act of patent
infringement.37 When a generic manufacturer files an ANDA that is issued with a
Paragraph IV certification, the branded company is promptly notified. The branded
company has 45 days from notification to file a patent infringement action against the
generic company based on the filing of the Paragraph IV certification alone.38 After the
suit has been filed, the FDA cannot approve the application until the generic company
successfully defends the suit or until 30 months have passed, whichever comes first.39
¶14
If a generic company is the first to file its ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification
and continues on to prevail in the subsequent patent infringement lawsuit, that generic is
granted a period of market exclusivity that lasts for 180 days. 40 A 2002 study conducted
by the FTC concluded that generic manufacturers that issued Paragraph IV certifications
prevailed in 73% of the patent litigation ultimately resolved by a court between 1992 and
2002.41 Given this relatively impressive success rate and the 180-day exclusivity period,
generic manufacturers have good reason to make Paragraph IV certifications. During the
180-day period, the generic manufacturer can price its product slightly below the branded
version, take market share, and maintain its price point before any other generics can
enter the market and bring down the price significantly. The potential for profits can be
especially great for manufactures that market generic forms of so-called
“blockbuster drugs.”
34

Letter from Henry G. Grabowski, Professor of Econ. and Dir. of the Program in Pharm. and Health
Econ. at Duke University, to Fed. Trade Comm’n Office of the Sec’y 1, 4 (Dec. 22, 2008), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/comments/healthcarecompissues/537778-00040.pdf.
35
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
36
Id.
37
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006).
38
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C).
39
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
40
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
41
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 4,
16 (2002), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
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¶15

Generic manufacturers are further incentivized to file Paragraph IV certifications
because this provision of the Act redistributes risk in favor of generics. 42 The
infringement suit that follows a Paragraph IV certification poses little risk to the generic
because it has not yet caused monetary injury to the branded company. 43 The generic has
filed an ANDA but has not yet marketed its product.44 Not only does the generic have a
good chance of winning the suit, but in the event that it loses the remedy granted to the
branded company is almost guaranteed to be low enough to warrant making the
Paragraph IV certification anyway.
¶16
In contrast, the branded company faces substantial risk because it stands to
potentially lose its current monopoly if its patent is deemed invalid.45 As a result of this
shift in risk distribution, branded manufacturers have a financial incentive to settle the
patent infringement claims that it makes as a result of Paragraph IV certifications.46 These
settlement agreements, called reverse-payment settlements, involve payments from the
branded company to the generic company in exchange for the generic company’s promise
to abandon its challenge and delay entering the market. The legality of these agreements
under the antitrust laws has come under scrutiny several times over the last decade.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE PATENT TEST
¶17

Until recently, the Second, Sixth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have been the only
circuits to decide the issue of reverse-payment settlements, and all used some variation of
the scope of the patent test. Although the D.C. Circuit was the first to be confronted with
a reverse-payment settlement case, that case was dismissed on the pleadings 47 and
therefore added little to the evolution of the scope of the patent test. Next, the Sixth
Circuit showed some skepticism regarding the validity of patent settlements and struck
down the reverse-payment agreement at issue because its reach was beyond the scope of
the patent.48 However, the actual outcome was unclear because the agreement at issue
involved products not covered by the challenged patent.49 The other three circuits to use
the scope of the patent test applied increasing deference and treated reverse-payment
agreements more leniently. Eventually, extreme deference reduced the scope of the patent
test to a mere formality with no real analysis of the parties’ conduct under the antitrust
laws. Essentially all reverse-payment agreements would pass muster under the latest
iterations of the scope of the patent test.
A. The Sixth Circuit

¶18

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, in the Sixth Circuit, involved a drug used
“for the treatment of angina and hypertension and for the prevention of heart attacks and
42

See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 207 (2d Cir. 2006).
See id. at 206.
44
Id. at 206–07.
45
Id. at 207.
46
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
47
Rosch, supra note 5, at 1, 2.
48
See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2003).
49
Rosch, supra note 5, at 3.
43

91

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

¶19

¶20

¶21

¶22

[2014

strokes.”50 One month after the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a
patent for the prescription drug Cardizem CD to the branded company Carderm, which
then licensed it to Hoescht Marion Roussel, Andrx Pharmaceuticals filed a Paragraph IV
certification.51 Soon after, Carderm and Hoescht sued Andrx for patent infringement,
triggering the thirty-month stay “during which the FDA could not approve
Andrx’s ANDA.”52
After several months of ongoing patent infringement litigation, the FDA announced
that it would approve Andrx’s ANDA when the thirty-month stay expired.53 This
prompted the litigants to enter into an interim settlement, only nine days after the FDA’s
announcement, where Andrx agreed not to market any generic version of the drug,
including those not at issue in the litigation, until it obtained a final determination that the
patent was not infringed.54 This meant that Andrx would stay off the market even after
FDA approval of its generic version of the drug. In doing so, Andrx would never use its
180-day period of exclusivity under § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) of the Hatch-Waxman Act and
also would prevent other Paragraph IV filers of the same drug from receiving FDA
approval.55 On the other end of the agreement, Hoescht agreed to pay Andrx $40 million
per year, which would increase to $100 million per year if the court determined that the
patent was not infringed.56
When the FDA issued its final approval of Andrx’s ANDA, Hoechst began to pay
Andrx to stay off the market.57 Two months later, Andrx reformulated its product and
obtained FDA approval on that version as well.58 Following this approval, Hoechst and
Andrx terminated the interim agreement and settled the infringement suit with Hoescht
paying Andrx $50.7 million, for a total of about $90 million.59
Of concern to the Sixth Circuit was the notion that the agreement between Hoechst
and Andrx prevented the marketing of all generic versions of the drug and that “it is one
thing to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but another
thing altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting competitors.”60 The
court found that the settlement guaranteed that Hoechst’s only potential competitor,
because of the 180-day exclusivity period, would “refrain from marketing its generic
version . . . even after it had obtained FDA approval.”61
The court concluded the settlement was “a horizontal agreement to eliminate
competition” and “a classic example of per se illegal restraint of trade” because it
temporarily eliminated all of Hoechst’s competition.62 This extended the branded

50

In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 901.
Id. at 902.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See id.
55
Id. at 907.
56
Id. at 902–03.
57
Id. at 903.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 908.
61
Id. at 907.
62
Id. at 908.
51
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company’s monopoly beyond what the patent granted. By striking down the agreement,
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cardizem punished conduct that was outside the scope
of the patent.
B. The Eleventh Circuit
¶23

Subsequent courts took a different view of the scope test, focusing instead on a
patent-holder’s right to exclude competitors from the market simply by virtue of having a
patent issued to it by the USPTO. The first to do so was the Eleventh Circuit in Valley
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.63 Abbott, the branded manufacturer, paid two
generic manufacturers to refrain from selling or distributing any pharmaceutical product
containing the drug at issue until certain conditions were triggered.64
¶24
Like other reverse-payment agreements, these settlement agreements came under
antitrust scrutiny because agreements between competitors to allocate the market are
considered “so obviously anticompetitive . . . that such agreements can be deemed to
violate the Sherman Act without much more than an examination of the agreement itself
and the relationship of the parties to the agreement.”65 The district court held that the
agreements between Abbott and the generic drug manufacturers were per se illegal under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.66 The court interpreted them as market allocations between
horizontal competitors.67
¶25
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that the agreements should not be
characterized as market allocation agreements where due consideration is given to
Abbott’s right to exclude.68 The court found that a full analysis of the reverse-payment
agreement required “consideration of the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent, the extent to which these provisions of the Agreements exceed that scope, and the
anticompetitive effects thereof.”69 In other words, the court held that reverse-payment
agreements must be analyzed to determine whether they exceed the patentee’s right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented subject matter. If the
agreement falls within the scope of the exclusionary right granted by patent law, antitrust
law is not implicated.
C. The Second Circuit
¶26

Courts then moved from punishing conduct outside the scope of the patent to
immunizing almost any activity within the scope of the patent. This marked a further shift
toward deference. In In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation,70 the Second Circuit
upheld a settlement agreement regarding a breast cancer treatment drug.71 Again, the

63

344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1300.
65
Id. at 1303.
66
Id. at 1304.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1306.
69
Id. at 1312.
70
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
71
See id. at 216, 220.
64
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branded manufacturer and patent holder paid the generic manufacturer to refrain from
selling the generic version of the drug.72 More specifically, the generic agreed to
withdraw its challenge on the patent and also agreed, by switching its Paragraph IV
certification to a Paragraph III certification, not to enter the market until the branded
company’s patent expired.73
¶27
In its analysis, the Second Circuit began by clearly asserting that reverse-payment
agreements did not constitute per se violations.74 It concluded that as long as “the patent
litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless” or beyond the patent’s scope, the
patentee can enter into a settlement “to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a
lawful monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the patented product.” 75 The
court shifted the focus away from what a patent holder could not do, what powers are not
conferred by a patent, and what is considered to be beyond the scope of a patent. Instead,
the court concluded that because branded manufacturers have patent rights, they have the
lawful authority to prevent “all generic versions of [a drug]” and that a competing version
“would . . . necessarily infringe the patent.”76 This approach assumes that the underlying
patent is in fact valid and deserving of monopolistic power and overlooks the importance
of having the validity of patents litigated.
D. The Federal Circuit
In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,77 the Federal Circuit
continued the move toward leniency and increasing deference. Much like the Second
Circuit, the court focused its analysis on the patent system’s right to exclude and the
presumption that patents are valid.
¶29
In 1987, the USPTO issued a patent covering the active ingredient in Cipro, a drug
prescribed to treat bacterial illnesses.78 In 1991, Barr Labs filed an ANDA for a generic
version of Cipro and included a Paragraph IV certification, claiming that the patent was
invalid.79 As in the previous cases, the branded company sued the generic manufacturer
for patent infringement.80 This time, just before the trial was set to begin, the parties
settled.81 In the settlement, Barr Labs agreed to change its Paragraph IV certification to a
Paragraph III certification in exchange for a payment of $49.1 million.82
¶30
The Federal Circuit found no error in the district court’s decision to grant the
branded company’s motion for summary judgment.83 It held that the agreement at issue
only “exclude[d] the defendants from profiting from the patented invention,” which is
¶28
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“well within” the branded company’s right as the patentee.84 It also expressly deferred to
a presumption of patent validity when it rejected the argument that a patent’s
exclusionary power is limited by the possibility that it is invalid.85
¶31
The Federal Circuit went one step further than the Second Circuit86 concluding that
the court “need not consider the validity of the patent” as long as there is no evidence of
fraud before the USPTO or sham litigation.87
E. Summary of Case Law Leading up to In re K-Dur
¶32

While initial versions of the scope test focused on antitrust liability and on
determining what conduct fell outside the scope of a patent’s exclusionary power,88 the
focus gradually shifted toward presuming that anything that falls within the scope of a
patent is valid.89 Under the more permissive scope rule, a patentee is essentially bestowed
with the right to exclude others from practicing its patent regardless of the effects this
might have on market competition and any possibility that the underlying patent is
actually invalid.90
¶33
Together, the case law leading up to In re K-Dur represents the rule that reversepayment agreements are not prohibited by antitrust laws except in the rare instances
where (1) the agreement restrains trade beyond the exclusionary scope of the relevant
patent, (2) the underlying patent infringement is a sham, or (3) the patent was obtained by
fraud.91 This rule raises the issue of whether patent infringement suits that arise from
Paragraph IV certifications have been reduced to nothing more than a necessary stepping
stone in the process of doing business in the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, “no court
applying the scope of the patent test has ever permitted a reverse-payment antitrust case
to go to trial.”92
III. MOVING AWAY FROM THE SCOPE TEST: IN RE K-DUR
¶34

In a dramatic departure from the scope of the patent test, the Third Circuit in In re
K-Dur Antitrust Litigation93 expressly rejected the scope test and adopted the “quick look
rule of reason test.”94
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A. Background
¶35

K-Dur is a sustained-release potassium chloride supplement used to treat potassium
deficiencies.95 The branded company, Schering, “did not hold a patent for the potassium
chloride salt itself, as that compound is commonly known and not patentable.”96 Rather,
“Schering held a formulation patent on the controlled release coating it applied to the
potassium chloride crystals.”97 Two separate settlements made with generic
manufacturers gave rise to the antitrust litigation.98
¶36
Upsher, a generic manufacturer, filed the first ANDA, including a Paragraph IV
certification, seeking approval to produce a generic version of K-Dur and was
subsequently sued by Schering for patent infringement.99 The litigation settled with an
agreement which “provided that, while Upsher did not concede the validity, infringement,
or enforceability of the . . . patent, it would refrain from marketing its generic” version or
any similar product until an agreed upon date.100 Upsher also granted Schering licenses to
make and sell several pharmaceutical products Upsher had developed. In return, Schering
agreed to pay Upsher $60 million over three years.101
¶37
Generic manufacturer ESI filed an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification only
months after Upsher filed its ANDA.102 The settlement agreement between Schering and
ESI “called for Schering to grant ESI a royalty-free license” under the patent beginning
on an agreed upon date and for Schering to pay ESI $5 million up front in addition to an
amount between $625,000 and $10 million depending on when ESI’s ANDA was
approved.103 ESI also “represented that it was not developing and had no plans to develop
any other potassium chloride product.”104
¶38
Both the FTC and various private parties filed antitrust suits attacking the two
settlements.105 The Eleventh Circuit heard and decided the FTC challenge using the scope
test.106 The private suits were consolidated in the District of New Jersey and gave rise to
the Third Circuit’s review of reverse-payment settlements in this case.107 The Third
Circuit concluded, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in the FTC challenge of the
same reverse-payment settlements, that an antitrust quick look rule of reason test should
apply rather than the scope of the patent test.108
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B. The Quick Look Rule of Reason Test
¶39

The court instructed the District Court to apply a quick look rule of reason analysis
to the remanded case.109 This test, unlike the scope test, looks to the economic realities of
the reverse-payment settlement at issue. In particular, the finder of fact “must treat any
payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry
into the market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, which could
be rebutted by showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry
or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.”110 In coming to the conclusion that reversepayments are prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint on trade, the court was
persuaded by an argument previously put forth by the D.C. Circuit. In Andrx
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International111, the D.C. Circuit suggested that it
only made logical sense that a “payment flowing from the innovator to the challenging
generic firm may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties entering
the agreement.”112
IV. THE SCOPE TEST’S SHORTCOMINGS
A. The Scope Test Tends to Protect Weak and Invalid Patents

The Third Circuit criticized the scope of the patent test’s practically irrefutable
presumption of patent validity because it “assumes away the question being litigated in
the underlying patent suit.”113 In contrast, the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have
agreed that, “in the absence of evidence of fraud before the USPTO or sham litigation,
the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a
settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.”114 In other words, the scope test
relies on the presumption that the patent holder would have prevailed on
validity issues.115
¶41
This presumption of patent validity is especially concerning because the holders of
weak or narrow patents, which are less likely to prevail in court when their validity
comes under judicial scrutiny, are the most likely to enter into reverse-payment
agreements in the first instance because they have the greatest incentive to do so. Nearly
seventy-five percent of generic manufacturers prevail in Paragraph IV-related patent
infringement suits that do get decided in court.116 This statistic alone provides some
insight into the prevalence of weak patents and the threat patent holders face when their
patents come under reevaluation.
¶42
If a branded manufacturer loses the underlying patent infringement case arising
from a Paragraph IV certification, it will certainly no longer control the market.
¶40
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Therefore, the holder of a weak or narrow patent has a strong incentive to settle its suits
outside of court in order to avoid the possibility of losing its patent and thus control of the
market. By allowing reverse-payment settlements to essentially bypass antitrust scrutiny,
the scope test effectively allows the holder of a weak patent to “buy its way out of both
competition with the challenging competitor and possible invalidation of the patent.”117
The settlement agreements at issue in some of the representative cases discussed in this
note reveal just how motivated branded companies with weak patents are to
settle their challenges.
¶43
For example, the patent for the controlled-release coating on K-Dur was initially
rejected by the USPTO and was then slightly modified by Schering to circumvent the
prior art.118 Both companies that filed ANDAs for generic versions of K-Dur had strong
arguments for how each generic did not infringe on the pioneer drug. Upsher’s defense
“was based on differences between the chemical composition of the controlled release
coating in its generic product and that of the invention claimed” in the patented
controlled-release coating.119 ESI defended on the ground that its generic version did not
employ a coating material with two different ingredients as claimed in the patent.120 Due
to the narrowness of Schering’s patent, it was very likely that the generic products did not
infringe the patent and would have been allowed to enter the market if the case had not
settled outside of court. Likewise, the patent at issue in Valley Drug was declared invalid
in a separate case that took place after the reverse-payment agreement.121 Once again, the
holder of a weak, or in this case an invalid, patent readily agreed to pay the supposedly
infringing generic to eliminate the threat to its questionable patent.
¶44
The mere fact that a patent holder would be willing to pay an alleged infringer to
settle a case and avoid the potential revocation of its patent should signal a red flag
indicating the weakness of the patent. A holder of a strong patent should not be
threatened by a Paragraph IV certification, and the cost of continuing litigation is
presumably lower, especially after remedies are awarded, than the millions of dollars
branded manufactures pay to generic companies in reverse-payment agreements.
B. The Scope Test is Contrary to the Policies Underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act
¶45

Earlier courts that used the scope test did so partially to satisfy the policy goal of
encouraging settlement, especially if it meant preserving incentives for innovation. The
Second Circuit, for example, stated that rules “severely restricting” settlements could
hamper the patent system’s goals by increasing uncertainty and delaying innovation. 122
But the Third Circuit correctly recognized that the Hatch-Waxman Act itself reflects
Congress’s position on the balance between competition and innovation in
the pharmaceutical industry.123
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¶46

The policy of encouraging settlements is important, but it should be considered in
light of countervailing public policy objectives. With respect to the pharmaceutical
industry, Congress knowingly dealt with competing policy interests and deliberately
decided that the equilibrium should shift toward favoring competition and increasing the
availability of low-cost generic drugs.124 These preferences are memorialized in the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Allowing reverse-payment settlements to escape antitrust scrutiny,
as the scope test does, defeats the goals of the Act because reverse-payment settlements
eliminate the competition that the Act seeks to increase.125
¶47
It is also important to note that the Third Circuit’s quick look rule does not prevent
parties from reaching settlements “based on a negotiated entry date for marketing of the
generic drug.”126 Only reverse-payments are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the Third
Circuit’s quick look rule.127 This means that the quick look rule does not limit the vast
majority of pharmaceutical settlements128 and thus continues to uphold the general
objective of encouraging settlements where no countervailing policy objectives
take precedent.
V. REOPENING THE DOOR FOR PHARMACEUTICAL COMPETITION
¶48

Although the FTC has been questioning reverse-payment settlements for almost a
decade now,129 the Third Circuit’s decision in In re K-Dur marks the first appellate court
decision to cast a shadow of uncertainty on the legality of reverse-payment settlements.
While the Sixth Circuit was the first to strike down a reverse-payment settlement in In re
Cardizem, as discussed previously, the facts in that case were sufficiently different from
those disputed in the Second, Third, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits because the
agreement included products outside the challenged patent.130 In summary, the Eleventh,
Second, and Federal Circuits all held reverse-payment agreements to be legal provided
that they are within the scope of the underlying patent. The Third Circuit, however, was
the first to decide in favor of the FTC’s position, holding that these agreements are
presumptively anti-competitive.
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A. Petitions for Certiorari
¶49

Certiorari petitions were filed asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review both In re
K-Dur and another challenge to a reverse-payment agreement in the Eleventh Circuit,
Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,131 which applied the scope
test and found the agreement to be legal.132 The petition in Watson Pharmaceuticals was
filed by the FTC, which, instead of simply filing a petition that asked to be bound by the
court’s decision in In re K-Dur, filed a full certiorari petition.133 The FTC argued that
Watson Pharmaceuticals was the superior vehicle for the Supreme Court to weigh in on
reverse-payment settlements because In re K-Dur was private litigation while the Watson
Pharmaceuticals case was “brought by a federal agency charged by Congress with
challenging unfair methods of competition.”134 The question presented in the FTC’s
certiorari petition was as follows:
[w]hether reverse-payment agreements are per se lawful unless the underlying
patent litigation was a sham or the patent was obtained by fraud (as the [Eleventh
Circuit] held), or instead are presumptively anticompetitive and unlawful (as the
Third Circuit has held).135

¶50

The FTC had good reason to want to control how the case was presented to the
Court. As the government agency “responsible for reviewing agreements settling
litigation under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments” the FTC has a vested interest in
ensuring that reverse-payment settlements receive proper legal treatment. 136 This interest
was further bolstered by the growing economic impact of these settlements. A 2010
analysis by the FTC found that reverse-payment settlements cost consumers $3.5 billion
annually.137 If companies are deterred from settling, a significant portion of this $3.5
billion could be recovered by consumers: the constituency Congress intended the HatchWaxman Act to protect. “The FTC estimates that about one year after market entry an
average generic pharmaceutical product takes over ninety percent of the patent holder’s
unit sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand product” and that
consumers are the greatest beneficiaries of generic entry.138
B. Actavis—The Supreme Court Weighs In

¶51

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 7, 2012 in Watson
Pharmaceuticals, later renamed Actavis.139 This marked “the culmination of almost a
decade of effort by the Federal Trade Commission to get [this issue] before the Court;
131
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what clinched the effort this time was the decision in the K-Dur case by the Third Circuit
in favor of the FTC’s position.”140 The case was argued on March 25, 2013, and on June
17, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its long-awaited ruling on reverse-payment
settlements of patent litigation.141
¶52
The Eleventh Circuit had dismissed the FTC’s complaint in Watson
Pharmaceuticals.142 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s
use of the scope of the patent test and held that “the Eleventh Circuit should have allowed
the FTC’s lawsuit to proceed.”143 Although the scope of the patent test was rejected, the
Third Circuit’s quick look rule of reason test was not entirely favored either.144 The Court
rejected the FTC’s arguments for finding reverse-payment settlements presumptively
unlawful and instead instructed lower courts to use a “rule-of-reason” approach.145 The
Court took issue with the quick look rule because such a rule is appropriate only where a
person having even a basic understanding of economics could come to the conclusion
that the agreement in question would be anti-competitive.146 Reverse-payment
settlements, according to the Court, do not “meet this criterion” because the effects of
these settlement agreements depend on several factors.147 The rule of reason test is not
intended to require empirical proof of the “virtues or vices of the patent system” or a
presentation of “every possible supporting fact or . . . every possible pro-defense theory,”
but the Supreme Court left it up to lower courts to structure the specifics of reversepayment antitrust litigation using the rule of reason approach.148
¶53
Following Actavis, reverse-payment settlements are not categorically immune from
the antitrust laws even when within the scope of the patent. This outcome is an important
win for the FTC. Lower courts must now weigh the settlement’s possible pro-competitive
benefits against its potential anticompetitive effects. Pharmaceutical manufacturers, both
branded and generic, should consider the balance of pro- and anticompetitive effects
when deciding whether to enter into a settlement. This consideration alone may reduce
the number of anti-competitive settlement agreements. Although the Supreme Court did
not grant certiorari in In re K-Dur, it was the circuit split that the Third Circuit created
that provoked the Supreme Court to review and decide this long-standing legal issue.149
As a result, the doors have been reopened for pharmaceutical competition.
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